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Abstract
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, it discusses how the functioning and
performance of food chains are affected by the way stakeholders are embedded in
the chains, by the coordination modes, and by the kind of governance. Second, by
depicting six relevant agro-food chains, attention is raised on the kind of the
stakeholders that participate in the chain and on the role of each with a special
focus on possible drawbacks of an effective functioning of the supply chains. The
chains outlined are (i) supply chains driven by a large retailer; (ii) supply chains
driven by a global processing company; (iii) supply chains driven by a cooperative;
(iv) supply chains for geographical indications; (v) short supply chains; and (vi) supply
chains driven by a specialized high quality retailer.
Special consideration is given to the positioning of farmers in each of the six chains
and to the outcomes they get. It is shown how: (i) going spot on the marketplace
may leave them with difficult market access and no bargaining power; (ii) being
embedded in supply chains framed in the context of a captive governance may
result in a squeeze of their profits as well as in unreliable market access; and (iii)
supply chains are populated by reciprocal and pooled relationships and ruled by a
more relational kind of governance, beside potentially bringing advantages in terms
of decision power and economic benefits, also raises difficulties and drawbacks due
to complexity of functioning, heterogeneity of stakeholders, and ambiguity of the
nature of relations among them.
Keywords: Hybrid institutions, Collective actions, Food, Coordination, Governance
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Background
Supply chains are complex entities usually populated by many firms and diverse
economic agents each contributing to deliver the final good to the consumer. They be-
long to the broad category of the so called hybrid institutions where the term hybrid
refers to complex organizational forms which many stakeholders performing jointly
tasks that neither the market nor the individual firm can achieve. The extremely wide
and heterogeneous literature on the topic confirms that economists increasingly
acknowledge the efficacy of the concept in analyzing the organization of supply and
are challenged by the complexity of these institutions when trying to better understand
their role in the organization of different aspects of the economic life (Hobbs 1996;
Menard 2004; Oliver 1990; Oliver and Ebers 1998).
Agricultural and Food
Economics
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Since the contributions by Davis and Goldberg and by Malassis (Davis and Goldberg
1958; Goldberg 1968; Malassis 1969), it is widely recognized that in industrial econ-
omies the production of food is organized in complex systems where diverse specialized
firms interact intensively and progressively modify raw materials, adding intermediate
input-ingredient services and anything that increase value to the final consumer. In the
last decades, the complexity of the system increased further so that it has been often
referred to as the industrialization of agriculture (Fonte and Cucco 2015; Traill 1996).
There is general consensus—both among researchers and practitioners—on the idea
that in order to market their products to be profitable, agro-food firms increasingly
need to be embedded in a network of relationships that goes beyond those of spot mar-
kets (Belaya and Hanf 2016; Bouamra-Mechemache et al. 2016; Galizzi and Venturini
1999). However, it is less clear which kind of relationships are better suited for the dif-
ferent tasks to be performed and what are the most effective ways to promote these
patterns of relations under different settings.
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, it discusses how the functioning and perform-
ance of food chains is affected by the way stakeholders are embedded in the chains, by
the coordination modes, and by the kind of governance. Second, by depicting a few
relevant kinds of agro-food chains, it seeks at showing that, in order to foster their
competitiveness and capacity to remunerate all the involved stakeholders, the complex-
ity of supply chains needs to be addressed and understood. As a side goal, the paper
aims at contributing to highlight the existence of some drawbacks that may impinge
the effectiveness of supply chain and, particularly, the gains that farmers may enjoy in
participating to them. In order to reach its goals, the paper extensively draws from dif-
ferent strands of economic literature as well as from the authors’ experience in the field
coming from several research projects and consultancies for public agencies on related
topics over quite a long time span.
The text is organized as follows: The second Section is devoted to shaping the theor-
etical framework for understanding the role and scope of supply chains as hybrid insti-
tutions. This also sets the basic terms and concepts for building the typologies of food
supply chains. The section also provides a discussion of the main peculiar features of
the agro-food sector that make the concept of supply chain particularly relevant for the
sector. The third Section is an attempt to contributing to a first taxonomy of supply
chains in the food sector by depicting six different chain typologies, their distinctive
features, the possible overlappings, and the strengths and limits of each one. Some con-
cluding remarks are given in the last Section.
A theoretical framework for supply chains as hybrid institutions
This section condenses the main theoretical insights provided by economic literature
that help understanding organizational forms in the agri-food sector with a specific
focus on supply chains. Supply chains belong to the vast category of hybrid institutions
(Ketchen and Guinipero 2004): a term indicating complex organizational forms that
seek at performing tasks that neither the market nor the firm can achieve under speci-
fied conditions. It is to the general category of hybrids, that includes supply chains
among many others, that we will largely refer in this section.
Mainstream, neoclassical economics reduces the firm to an unspecified entity with
few insights on what happens inside; all the light is shed on the purposes and outcomes
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of market exchanges. This helped at better understanding the market and the ways it
brings economic efficiency under a set of hypothesis.
Differently, many quite different strands of literature—such as New Institutional
Economics, Business and Management Economics, Economic Geography as well as
many contributions from Applied and Agricultural Economics—placed the firm, its
functions, and its relationships different than the market ones at the center of the
scene. So doing, these diverse approaches helped in better understanding the condi-
tions that limit scope and efficiency of the market and provide the rationale for the
diversity of organizational forms that are observed in real world.
As the forces that play an important role in the trade-off between the firm and the
market are many and diverse, situations may arise and remain stable over time where
neither of the two poles prevails and hybrid institutions arise. Besides, and not less
important, hybrid institutions are required when there is a need for managing common
pooled resources and/or when any other form of collective action is essential for
effectively managing supply.
After discussing thoroughly these issues, the section addresses the existence of some
relevant drawbacks related to hybrids and concludes with some basic terminology.
The trade-offs between markets and firms: factors pushing towards hybrids
The first element playing a role in determining to what extent the market and the firm
can be effective alternatives for organizing production is the separability of the
production process. Coeteris paribus, the less separable the different operations of the
production process, the larger scope for the firm as it shall perform the whole process
from raw materials and inputs, down to the final product. On the contrary, when the
process includes separable independent stages, each single firm will not necessarily per-
form it totally in-house. In case the firm specializes in one or few steps of the whole
process, it will, hence, need to exchange semi-processed intermediate products.
Technological change, including improvements in transportation and storage of both
intermediate and final goods, has, so far, largely increased separability.
The degree of separability in itself is not, however, a sufficient cause for more exten-
sive use of the market. Segmentation will actually occur depending on the balance
between advantages and disadvantages. Specializing in one or few functions can im-
prove productivity (increase output/input ratio) and/or increase the ability to get higher
quality/value output. The higher the gains associated to specialization the less vertically
integrated will be the process and the smaller scope will be observed for one single firm
with fewer interactions with the outside environment other than that of the market for
final products.1
The major element that pushes towards specialization and hence towards more mar-
ket is connected to idiosyncrasy of the inputs required at the different steps of the
production process.2 When these inputs are costly difficult to acquire and/or to man-
age, higher efficiency levels stem from specialization of the firms contributing to the
different steps. Economies of scale can also be a source of idiosyncrasy when different
fixed inputs are used that operates at different scales (Teece 1992).
One related issue is raised by the existence of different entry/exit barriers that may
occur at the different stages of the production process. When this is the case, the
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outcome can, again, be fragmentation with different sizes for the different steps. A
sound example of all these aspects of idiosyncrasy is provided by agriculture that uses
land as a basic input. The use of land has relevant implications in terms of the manage-
ment of the production process as time is required for moving worker machineries and
other inputs across the farm. This means that the efficient scale for primary production
is typically smaller compared to that for the subsequent operations. Moreover, land is
subject to relevant entry barriers, especially in densely populated countries, thus, fur-
ther reducing the operational scale of farming. Last, idiosyncrasies are also related to
land as it is part of the natural environment. Natural resources present variable features
in different places and determine a strong rooting of the primary process in specific
locations, while the subsequent steps are generally less rooted on one specific location
and are definitely more mobile.
One additional aspect of idiosyncrasy is related to the timing of the different opera-
tions. Referring to the basic idea introduced by Georgescu-Roegen with the fund-flow
theory (Georgescu-Roegen 1969), one more argument is raised for the increased effi-
ciency obtained by separating the different operations. Once again, the primary sector
offers a good example as many biological processes at the bases of food production
may require extremely variable time spans. These last from few days, or even hours, to
several years providing scope for more segmentation and specialization in the agri-food
sector where it is not unlikely to find firms specialized in the maturing of products as it
is the case in the cheese and cured pork meet industries.
Switching to the firm side of the market-firm trade-off brings other relevant argu-
ments showing how complex can be the balance between the two. The first is provided
by the complementarity concept.3 When one input (e.g., knowledge, physical invest-
ment, technology) is jointly used by different steps of the production process, other
things being equal, these will be more efficiently performed within one firm. In this
sense, there may be relevant complementarities in information flows and in the genera-
tions and transmission of knowledge that may also push towards vertical integration.
This is related to aspects such as: information asymmetries (that cause market failure)
and contextualized informal knowledge.4
The concept of transaction costs provides one unique and sound perspective to look
at all the situations in which the cost of using the market is higher compared to relying
more on the firm. Clear enough, all the above factors are strictly connected one to each
other. For example, complementarity creates a bound between actions and usually re-
quires communication for reciprocal continuous adjustment and, hence, also trust en-
ters in the picture. In the same streamline of reasoning, to the purposes of this paper, it
is interesting to highlight, that producing high quality goods requires large information
flows, a process of continuous learning and innovation that entails co-specialization be-
tween the resources used at the different stages. In other words, product quality is
mostly multidimensional (Ponte and Gibbon 2006) and implies complementarities and
includes relevant hidden features that call for information (Nelson 1970). All factors
are calling for proximity and long-lasting relations so as in the vertical integration case.
As basically dealing with living organisms (e.g., plants, animals, soil, and micro-
organisms), primary production is intrinsically variable and non-standardizable. Unpre-
dictable events, such as attacks from parasites or pathogens, climatic variations, and
other environmental accidents, are everyday business for farmers that can hardly follow
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pre-fixed, codified rules of conduct. Changes that occur in one step call for ongoing ad-
justments in subsequent ones. Adjustments, in turn, require communication, co-
decisions, and alignment of actions. Knowledge is, hence, informal and requires face-
to-face contacts, repeated interactions that are often tacit. The role of trust in case of
uncertainty and information asymmetry also pushes towards more scope for tighter re-
lationships as those within one same firm. All in all, households proved to be effective
in assuring communication of informal knowledge among family members and its
inter-generational transmission (Corsi 2009). The higher trust usually shared among
family members also reduces the risk of free riding or other moral hazard behaviors.
Also relevant to the ends of this discussion is the case of demand-driven vertical inte-
gration. That is to say when supply is shaped based on vertically integrated firm so as
to satisfy peculiar requests from the consumers’ side. A good example of this kind of
situation is provided by the food sector where consumers’ concerns about food safety
have been a major driving force for the shortening of the supply chains, in some cases
to the result of almost (quasi) complete vertical integration.
It should be clear from the above discussion that major features entering in the
market-firm trade-off are many and diverse and that a clear dominance on either side
is more likely to be an exception than the general rule. Hybrid institutions emerge
when both sets of forces are at stake. Resulting hybrids would be of different kinds ac-
cording to the set of factors that play a larger influence. Obviously, these forces are
subject to change over time, continuously re-shaping hybrids.
Hybrid institutions: pulling factors
The production process may include functions that cannot be performed nor by the
market neither by single firms. Hybrids can perform a number of them. Among these,
building firm’s reputation is of major relevance. Following Tirole’s seminal contribution
(Tirole 1996), it is well acknowledged that the reputation of the individuals is never
only an individual matter. On the contrary, this is, at least to some extent, connected
to the reputation of the group to which the individual (person or institution) belongs.
Thus, reputation is related to social embeddedness and calls for collective action. This
explains, for example, the role played by Country of Origin labeling (COOL) also in
sectors with well-established brand strategies.
One particular case is that of small firms that may hardly be visible and build their
own individual reputation in larger markets, unless they collaborate and somehow asso-
ciate in order to build a common reputation at a larger scale. Usually, strategies as such
are based on common features upon which the common images rely (e.g., the place of
production, the technology adopted, one peculiar resource used).
Trust enters again in our picture as, by its very nature, it implies reciprocity and, hence,
is, by definition, related to collective action. Building trust requires connections and being
embedded in relational set-ups with partners, counterparts, suppliers, buyers, etc. Trust is
a component of social capital; it can facilitate exchanges and lowers transaction costs. It is
favored by repetition of interactions over time, by proximity and embeddedness in the
local as well as in the wider society (Becattini 1991; Putnam et al. 1994).
Also external economies—both in the form of network economies and location econ-
omies—are extensively relational and may call for collective actions (Schmitz 1995).5
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For example, web networks usually help small companies to be more visible both in
the business environment (i.e., in B2B relationships) and in the market for the final
product. In districs/clusters, close-by firms will be more efficient due to the cost-
lowering effect of spatial proximity ( Becattini 1991; Ketchen et al. 2004; Porter 1998).
The spatial density of firms selling the same product is also attractive for buyers as it
lower search costs. Service providers may also benefit from spatial density of client con-
tractors and the like.
In the agro-food sector, the place of production is connected to important quality fea-
tures (also see previous section). Thus, sharing the same place of production may imply
sharing quality and reputation. This link between the place of production and product
reputation is twofold. In fact, the produce is reputed after the place of origin in case
the last is already renowned for the quality of its products. However, also the reverse
holds: some places gain status after the increased fame of their products. In this sense,
sharing the same location calls for location economies and reputational linkages and is
a source for the need of collective action.
Issues raised by the presence of location economies are interlaced with those of the
management of common pooled resources (CPR) (i.e., partially rival, partially exclud-
able resources localized in relatively small areas) that also call for collective action at
the local level (Ostrom 1990). Relevant examples for our line of reasoning are natural
resources (i.e., the landscape water, biodiversity, traditional or wild landraces and so
forth); also collective reputation in case this is connected to the production area (see
above). When the reputation of the products is related to the place of origin, it acts as
a CPR and requires collective management at local level.
Last but not least, one more collective action frequently at the origin of hybrids that
pulls for horizontal coordination is aimed at countervailing the market power of larger
scale firms. John Galbraith (1952) reversed the usual argument against actions usually
considered as proactive forms for reducing competition. He highlighted the need and
legitimacy for smaller firms to build countervailing action in order to rebalance the
market power of large counterparts. Besides, as discussed above, smaller firms (i.e.,
those operating at inefficiently small scales due to barriers and market imperfections)
need to associate somehow (i.e., in cooperatives) in order to be able to reach a more
convenient scale at least for performing the key tasks in terms of their incidence on the
unitary production.
Hybrid institutions: major drawbacks
Besides being able to efficiently perform relevant economic tasks, as discussed above,
hybrids face some relevant drawbacks and limits that, in the author’s view, tend to be
disregarded and/or mistreated in the literature and by practitioners and policy makers.
Among the major ones, we here recall:
 The functioning of hybrids faces a high level of complexity. Modifications in the
internal or external relevant conditions require adjustments and reactions that need
agreements or, at least, alignments of changing behaviors and actions by many and
diverse agents. Let us take the example of firms that jointly invest for innovating.
Innovation is often the adaptive answer of the supplier to the needs expressed by
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the client. The client usually shares with the supplier the know-how and skills
required for searching the innovative solution. The firms, thus, need to cooperate
and specialize together, or, saying it with Teece, they co-specialize (Teece 1992).
Co-specializing creates a link between the two (or more) firms. This link is not only
associated to an increase of the value of the final product but also exposes the
partners to losses in case one of the two breaks the cooperation. The process
requires complex reciprocal repeated exchanges co-learning and other cooperative
attitudes and activities.
 In case of relational governance or when the action of the focal company is not
effective, the decision process is more democratic, adding complexity to the overall
functioning and to the adjustment process. Coeteris paribus, this drawback is more
likely to arise in large and heterogeneously populated hybrid institutions (Olson
1965).
 Complexity also implies that the timing of reaction to changes in the market setting
tends to be slow. In a market environment of frequent and sudden changes, this
may impinge the competitiveness of the hybrid.
 Firms involved in a collective action of any kind are linked by multifaceted
relationships that are somehow twofold. On the one side, they are supposed to
collaborate, to cooperate for the common ends that gave birth to the hybrid.
Notwithstanding, they are, at the same time, either competing on the same markets
or even for selling to the very same clients and, thus, they are likely to have
conflicting interests. In other cases, they may also have diverging goals. All these
sources of ambiguities may undermine reciprocal trust and raise scope for
opportunistic behaviors. A partial recovery may be provided by setting internal
control systems that, far from being fully effective, may reduce drawbacks to some
extent while being, however, costly and demanding in time.
 The points already mentioned converge to one additional difficulty that lies in the
increasing complexity of functions assigned to the management of the firms
involved within the hybrid. In sectors such as agriculture, populated mostly by
family-run business, competences for dealing with complex managerial tasks as such
may, frequently, be missing.
Supply chains as hybrid institutions
We have already acknowledged that hybrids are many and diverse and that they are
changeable over time, representing a vast and multiform way of organizing supply. The
concept is increasingly regarded as a useful tool to get insights in understanding supply
development patterns. Among the most common hybrids in the economic literature, it
is worth recalling: clusters, industrial districts, producers associations, consortia, supply
chains, networks, cooperatives and their associations, net-chains and so forth, with
always new ones arising.
Obviously, in real world, also each of the previous type of hybrid forms a continuum
where features mix-up and gradually changes one into the others as it is the case, for
example, of supply chains (Gereffi et al. 2005). Also, interactions and intersections
among the different types are frequent: each stakeholder can contribute at the same
time to different chains, interacting right with the same partner or with different ones.
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This behavior stems from more than one cause. Among these, it is worth to shortly re-
call: (i) The search for different markets and marketing channels, in order to seek the
possibility to sell larger quantities and as a strategy for diversification and risk reduc-
tion; (ii) Reaching different market segments is also a necessary strategy due to the di-
verse quality of the final product. In fact, food quality is intrinsically variable due to
climate and biotic factors that are never under complete producers’ control. Quality
may vary over time but also in the same production year, so that high and low qualities
of the very same product are to be truly considered as conjoint productions. A com-
mon behavior in such cases is to market the different production slots through different
channels in order to meet consumers need in each market segments and to maintain
the producers’ reputation; (iii) Selling through different channels may also help in sta-
bilizing stocks; (iv) Global logistics companies—that thanks to the New Information
Technologies (NITs) expanded impressively their capability to process extremely large
amounts of information flows and to act just in time and right in place (Coe
2014)—operates not only vertically within chains but also horizontally across chains. As
a consequence of the dense layers of intersections of diverse nature that exist among
stakeholders operating in the agro-food sector, it should always be kept in mind that
the typologies presented hereafter are just very simple skeletons of the much more
complex real ones. All these different chains share the common trait of being popu-
lated by groups of firms, that participate in one production process and are somehow
connected to each other by establishing relations that are not only spot market. In any
case, two aspects are always essential: the relationships among stakeholders and the
overall governance of the hybrid.
Relationships refer to the way agents interact with each other. This is usually referred
to as the coordination issue, where market coordination is the most loose and casual
form of exchange. Intermediate forms of coordination are given by those provided, for
instance, by bar codes. Going further on the gradient of intensity of the relation leads
to, first, informal agreements and commitments and, second, to formal contracts where
agents are obliged to do, or not to do, something. Closer coordination modes can be
really diverse forming a large spectrum. A few examples are joint ventures, licensing
agreements, technology transfer agreements, and diverse kind of partnerships. Last, re-
lations within one firm, obviously, represent the most tight and rigid kind of
coordination.
Relationships are vertical in case the actors linked operate at different layers of the
process (i.e., one farmer and one processor) or horizontal in case the actors linked are
operating in the same production layer (i.e., the farmers in a cooperative). One more
relevant aspect of coordination deals with the number and the role of stakeholders:
relations can be bilateral with one direction in this case are classified as sequential; they
can be bilateral with two directions and in this case are labeled as reciprocal; and can
be multilateral and as such are defined as pooled (Lazzarini et al. 2001).
The term governance refers to the management of the stakeholders and of their ac-
tions; in other words, it refers to the entire process. More in details, governance is the
actions of driving the coordination and the selection of the participants and the rules
for distributing value added (Gereffi et al. 2005; Ponte and Gibbon 2006; Ponte and
Sturgeon 2014). With reference to supply chains, the governance has been classified by
Gereffi et al. (2005) in five main typologies that stem from the degree of participation
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to the decision process of the different stakeholders. These are here presented very
shortly: (i) market, relationships are spot and switching to new partners is easy and low
cost; (ii) modular, suppliers customize their services/intermediate inputs to the cus-
tomer’s needs, they take responsibility, make specific investments (that are sunk costs
outside that specific chain), and have core competences in the technology used; (iii)
relational, transactions are complex, there is mutual dependence, and assets are highly
specific for both sides. Reputation and trust are relevant features in this kind of govern-
ance; (iv) in captive governance, the led firm exerts strict monitoring and has control
over the other firms; moreover, switching to other partners is difficult and costly; (v)
hierarchic governance refers to the case of vertically integrated firms where managers/
headquarters have full power over subordinates/subsidiaries/affiliates.
In real world, these basic kinds of chain governance can mix-up giving birth to many
different combinations. In general, looser kinds of governance refer to situations in
which the focal company exerts a feeble guidance on the supply chain, or in other
words, the degree of drivenness is low. Furthermore, there is some degree of trust
among all participants who have voice in determining actions and strategies and there
are possibilities of mutual adjustments. Galizzi and Venturini (1999) explicitly connect
the concept of market power to that of the firmness of the governance when they pose
that a large company, that retains market power on its suppliers, does not need to
integrate vertically in order to get full control over the whole process.
Supply chains for food
Premises
Supply chains are many and diverse, spanning from a simple straight line of firms, strictly
guided by the focal company, to a loose bundle of firms basically interacting via spot rela-
tionships and with almost no governance other than market. This section discusses six
different chain typologies relevant to the agro-food sector. These are representative of the
sector in different ways. Some of them account for very large shares of the worldwide food
markets. Others represent small market niches but are extremely dynamic and indicate
path of changes whose importance goes far beyond the actual figures.
The six models portrayed can be roughly gathered in two groups where the first in-
cludes supply chains that represent the bulk of agro-food production at global level;
here, we find food supply chains whose governance is in the hands of a large retail
company; those led by global processing companies; and those with a cooperative as
focal company. The second group mainly refers to emerging chains focused on high
quality products with a limited but rapidly growing shares in different food markets.
The first case is that of traditional/typical products protected by a geographical indica-
tion; the second is more loosely defined as the short chain case; while, the last chain
type is led by retail companies specialized in high quality or excellence food. A compre-
hensive overview of the six supply chains is provided in Tables 1 and 2 that also allow
for immediate comparisons of their main features. The discussion and the content of
the figures are based on the literature as well as on the authors’ direct experience in
the field and shall be regarded as a theoretical framework for the analysis and compre-
hension of how supply chains are organized in the food sector. No original data provid-
ing empirical evidences of the suggested picture is given in this paper.
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A tentative taxonomy
Supply chains driven by a large retailer
These chains are almost anywhere around the world and holds extremely large and still
increasing shares of total turnover of the food sector. Their massive presence is the re-
sult of a growth that took place at a very fast pace during the last decades even in the
so called emerging economies and it is still ongoing (Sexton 2013). The retailers that
govern the supply chain operate at a large scale and in many cases are multinational
global companies (i.e., Wal-Mart, Carrefour, Tesco, just to recall the world largest
ones). This includes global sourcing and multinational locations of the stores (Table 1).
Besides the retailer, these chains are populated by many actors such as farms, process-
ing firms, logistics companies, intermediaries, and providers of different kind of ser-
vices (including market analysts, advertising agencies, lawyers and experts in legal
matters). The functions performed by these actors require different skills and different
times and have diverse capital investments and efficient scales, thus partially explaining
the complexity of the chain.
This complexity of the chain structure and functioning calls for vigorous governance.
The different sizes and roles of the stakeholders—with the retailer at the very vertex of
this pyramidal structure—allow for an essentially captive governance of the retailer
(Table 2). The relationships that give life to the chains are basically vertical sequential.
This goes from spot market transactions to long-term contracts that include rules of
production, specified in details, and control systems. One major issue is product quality
that shall be standardized and constant over time (Table 1). To this end, contracts usu-
ally include quite strict rules of production (set by the retailer) and technical assistance
and controls. Third party certifications on safety and other quality features are widely
used; namely, Global-g.a.p. and Local-g.a.p,6 as well as ISO standards and private stan-
dards set at company level. In cases where relevant concerns for innovation involve raw
materials and/or intermediate inputs, joint projects/actions may be undertaken with
the suppliers, including forms of collaborations and co-financing.
The retailer enjoy a high degree of flexibility in shaping and re-shaping commercial
relationships; in other words, he is able to switch rapidly from one supplier to a new
one thanks to its power and in response to changes in demand or in any other relevant
feature (Table 2). Flexibility adds more strength to the model and contributes to
explaining its success.
As the needs that drive these chains basically relate to consumer’s search for convenience
attributes, low price and wide choice (Table 1), one more factor that pushes towards their
complexity and variety is the focus on catching the diverse and changing demand trends.
This is at the basis, for example, of the differentiation of store formats (i.e., megastores, su-
permarkets, convenience stores, discounts) and locations (shopping malls, residential area,
downtown, etc.; however, their internet sales are also becoming very relevant).
These chains have the capacity to properly sizing the scale of each steps and the pos-
sibility to raise scope economies. Large retailers offer an extremely wide range of prod-
ucts and have extended opening hours, allowing also consumers to enjoy scope
economies via saving time while shopping; Russo 2013). Altogether, these give a tre-
mendous cost advantage to these chains (Sexton 2013; Coe 2014). This, together with
the bargaining power of the focal company and its capacity to retain large shares of the
total value added created in the chain, allows for making significant investments in
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marketing and especially in reputation (for strengthening retail brand loyalty) and
innovation (basically to catch-up with large processors) (Table 1) (Galizzi and Venturini
1999). These investments add capacity in understanding and matching the final de-
mand; a feature with respect to which the retailer has always many advantages thanks
to its closeness to consumers.
For processors and, even more, for farmers, being part of one of these market chan-
nels has strong implications, among which it is here worth recalling:
(a)Providers often operate under contracts that give a multiple-years’ time horizon for
organizing production and planning their investments. This situation has, undoubtedly,
positive implications, especially for smaller marginalized farms that otherwise may face
major difficulties in accessing markets (Pulina 2010). However, the retailer usually has
the possibility to exclude a provider in case it is no longer performing and/or competitive.
When less stable relationships are preferable for the focal company, competition among
suppliers is enhanced by the governance strategy of the buyer that holds the right to break
the contract (Baritaux and Houdart, 2015).
(b)Large volumes are required in order to avoid fragmentation of purchases that
increase transaction costs (Baritaux and Houdart, 2015; Ponte 2007). Smaller
producers and those that are not embedded in any hybrid institutions on a stable
fashion may have no access to large retailers as they may not be able to guarantee
they can meet quantity/quality thresholds and find it difficult to coordinate with the
due complex logistic functions.
(c)One more obstacle is represented by the financial capabilities required to manage
time gaps between supplying products and receiving payments (Agrosynergie 2008).
Not to say about listing fees often asked by the retailer (Ponte 2007).
(d)Few cases are, however, emerging of farmers operating in these chains in a less
captive position thanks to the increasing demand for fresher, more genuine, and
local food. For example, some outlets of large retailing companies “host” raw milk
dispensers from local producers and individual stands with local seasonal products.
The major implication is that large retailing companies have increasing interest in
valorizing connections with the primary sector, or at least with some parts of it.
More than a change in the chain nature, this can be regarded as a sort of mimetic
attitude of the chain.
All in all, these chains led to a progressive squeezing of producers’ revenues (and
profits). Less captive situations may occur in cases where the farmers manage to
organize (through producers associations and/or coops) for increasing their bargaining
power (Menard 2004; Yu and Bouamra-Mechemache 2015).
Supply chains driven by a global processing company
Large processing firms with a very well established reputation on final markets
usually hold the governance of the food chain in which they operate (Table 1); they
are usually multi-locational globalized corporate companies, buying raw materials
and other inputs from a very large set of farms/firms that are in a quasi-captive
position and are connected to the focal company mainly with vertical sequential
relations (Table 1 and 2).
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The market for their final product(s) tends also to be global. They use diverse market
channels, including large retailers, more traditional outlets, and in some cases, they also
develop their own branded retail chains. When selling to large retailers, they are
probably the only kind of stakeholders that enjoy almost symmetric bargaining power
with respect to the buyer, while in all the other cases, they are clearly leading the
transactions and imposing their conditions.
The major assets of these companies are the know-how and the reputation associated
to their trademark (Table 1). Quality and innovation are their main competitive advan-
tages (Table 2). The price premiums they get over generic substitutes allow for profits
and for investments in further promotion and innovation. As said, in these chains,
innovation is core and the focal firm makes huge investments in R&D trying to be
always ahead of competitors and imitators. Patents are commonly used to protect
innovations/products, while protocols and standards adopted within the chain are kept
as secret as possible. The internal protocols drive the task of coordinating the provision
of raw materials and intermediate inputs.
Like in the previous case here, also scale and scope economies play a major role in
shaping the structure and functioning of the supply chain together with timing,
constraints that bound production of raw material to land, and other sources of
idiosyncrasies that differentiate the pattern of strengths and weaknesses at the different
stages of the process that is well segmented (see Section “A theoretical framework for
supply chains as hybrid institutions”).
Similar to the case of chains driven by large retailer, and probably even more than
that, these large processing firms are able to quickly follow changes in demand trends,
and even to anticipate and influence them. They also enjoy similar mimetic capabilities
that allow them to dress, so to say, their products according the always changing
demand trends. One more similarity between these two kinds of chains is that they face
the opposition of small but increasing groups of consumers that fights against market
(and political) power of large companies. As they feel they have no voice, they choose
the exit option boycotting the goods of such companies (Fridell 2006).
From the farmers’ perspective, the consequences and challenges of accessing and
operating in this kind of chains are similar to the ones already stated for the previous
chains. Furthermore, considering that these chains are dominated by the processor and
deal only (by definition) with processed food, the visibility and role of the primary
sector is even smaller.
Supply chains driven by a cooperative
One more chain typology has a large cooperative as focal company. Historically, coops
are active and play a relevant role in the organization of food supply worldwide, al-
though, their nature and role varies significantly across the different countries. Coops
are themselves hybrid institutions whose pillar is a strong and stable horizontal coord-
ination set populated by pooled relationships (Tables 1 and 2). Coops usually are asso-
ciations of farmers; although, there may be coops whose members are processors,
retailers or other kind of stakeholders. As these chains are populated by actors belong-
ing to the same layer of the production process, their governance is basically relational
with the coop management that acts as the focal company and respond to the assembly
of members (Tables 1 and 2). In principle, all members are expected to enjoy
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symmetric decisional power; however, as they may differ widely in size and in other
relevant features, democracy is not always fully assured.
The small size of farms, that often operate at suboptimal scale, with all the related in-
efficiencies, has traditionally given a relevant scope for coops in the food sector com-
pared to others (see Section “A theoretical framework for supply chains as hybrid
institutions”). Coops are usually engaged in: (i) helping their members to improve
efficiency; (ii) gaining better access to know-how, services, and all sorts of inputs; (iii)
building countervailing power for buying inputs and marketing products. Conse-
quently, coops are active in many fields such as buying inputs and/or sell outputs;
acquiring the appropriate know-how, including investing in R&D; investing in storages,
machineries, and any kind of facilities that are also managed by the coop; developing
marketing strategies; and exerting lobbying actions in the members’ interests.
The appropriate size of coops depends, obviously, on the reference market and on
the tasks that should be accomplished, so that coops are differing in size. However, as
many coops act in different fields (see above), significant degrees of flexibility are
achieved by creating different layers of coops with the appropriate size and performing
the different tasks. However, this is not always the case, as, only countries with a devel-
oped cooperative sector can enjoy such a complex and more effective structure. In such
cases, a system of vertical relationships among coops is put in place, with first level
coops (i.e., coops whose members are farmers) that are nested into second level coops
(i.e., coops whose members are coops), and so forth.
Depending on the kind and quality of management, coops may be more market ori-
ented or more member/producer oriented. In other words, this means that, in the first
case, the coop seek at actively looking for its targets and may induce members to
undertake major changes and even to challenge themselves. The second case occurs
more likely when the coops are more committed in delivering services to the members
and in less pro-active in the marketing areas. In such cases, it may happen that no ef-
fective incentives for product quality are in place. In such cases, quality standards for
the raw material delivered by members to the coop are aimed at minimizing products
found to be defective with the goal to limit refusals and members’ losses in the short
run. This has clear negative effects on the chain competitiveness as it leads to poor
quality of the final product and, over time, to poor reputation (Carbone et al.
2010). Such situations conflict with the goal of targeting at high quality markets
and may cause a mismatch with the intrinsic vocation of coop to valorize quality
and the territory (at least the first level ones) as they have strong roots in the area
of production where their members operate. Relaxed quality standards and weak
control systems may allow for free riding behaviors that impinge the effectiveness
of the collective action that is the actual pillar of the coop (Ortmann and King
2007) (Table 1). Evidences on effectiveness and efficiency of coops are mixed in
the literature, suggesting that contextual factors do play a major role in their func-
tioning and competitiveness (Agrosynergie 2008). Following the above description
and the arguments brought on a more general ground about drawbacks of hybrid
institutions (see Section “A theoretical framework for supply chains as hybrid insti-
tutions”), it is not difficult to understand that one major weakness of cooperatives
resides in the complexity and time requiring process of its relational governance
where reciprocal trust and the management capacity to align interest and actions
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are as important as efficiency issues and availability of marketing skills and
expertise.
Supply chains for geographical indications
Geographical indications (GIs) are names for traditional food that refer to the location
where production takes place (Table 1).7 All the producers based in the area are enti-
tled to sell their product with the name of the place of origin and, thus, they share the
reputation that is a CPR and also depends on how the PDO/PGI is managed
(Menapace and Moschini 2012). Stakeholders participating in the PDO/PGI are
farmers, processors, firms in charge of the aging process (as it may be the case in the
cheese and cured meet industries), and those specialized in the packaging. Participating
in a GI is motivated by the necessity to reach higher volumes to be marketed under the
same name in cases when producers are individually too small in order to affirm their
own reputation. Both horizontal and vertical relationships (pooled and sequential) shall
be in place (Table 2). The law indicates the Consortium that gathers all the stake-
holders involved in the PDO/PGI as the focal institution of the chain. Accordingly, the
Consortium is in charge of aligning actions, settling controversies among members,
detecting frauds, controlling and protecting product quality and its reputation and,
finally, promoting the PDO/PGI on the market (Tables 1 and 2) (Desquilbert and
Monier-Dilhan 2015). It is clear that the whole apparatus behind the collective
reputation of a PDO/PGI is complex and delicate (Carbone 1997; Zago 2015).
It is not unlikely to find PDO/PGIs that remain on paper or sell only very small
quantities compared to the potentials of the area. This happen when the PDO/PGI is
de facto set by local policy makers or by producers’ associations who do not effectively
involve stakeholders. In turn, this is more likely to be the case when the chain is popu-
lated by firms that are so small that face severe difficulties in directly marketing their
products and, thus, there is almost nobody able to enjoy the potential benefits of the
PDO/PGI (Carbone et al. 2014). In such cases, the product specification that rules the
GI may include features that producers may not be able, or willing, to fulfill.
Reflecting different outfits of the supply chain, PDO/PGI products are sold through
different market channels, from supermarkets to traditional specialty shops to the
trendy specialized retailers: directly by the producer on-farm or via web. According to
the different channels, they can be truly high quality niche products that gain price pre-
miums over their generic substitutes or may be considered almost as commodities
where price competition is definitely intense (Sckokai et al. 2013; Carbone et al. 2014).
This variety of situations within one unique quality scheme has been addressed as a
cause of reputational puzzling that reduces the effectiveness of the GI (Carbone 1997).
Due to freedom of entry, often GIs involve highly heterogeneous groups of stake-
holders. As the chain is, by definition, based on the managing of a CPR, a major threat
to their functioning is the effective alignment of actions. The larger the protected area
and the number of producers (together with their heterogeneity), the more difficult will
be to reach an effective agreement for the GI governance and the more likely will be
that conflicts and free riding behaviors arise. To this respect, it is worth recalling that
one of the major concerns about GIs regards cases where the governance falls in the
hands of one (or few) very large firm(s) that will drive the GI in its(their) own prevail-
ing interest. Usually, this will be a large processing firm. Considering that under the GI
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the farmers are supposed to sell to processors within the GI (otherwise they will not
get for their raw material the higher value that the GI worth), it is easy to conclude that
in such cases farmers can paradoxically find themselves in a captive position with an
even worsened bargaining capacity.
Furthermore, as being gathered under the same PDO/PGI requires cooperation,
while, at the same time, enhances competition, free-riding and other opportunistic
behaviors may arise that may damage some of the producers and as well as the con-
sumers as pinpointed in Section “Hybrid institutions: major drawbacks” (Carbone 1997;
Dentoni et al. 2013).
It should be very clear now that the difficulties of action discussed in Section “A the-
oretical framework for supply chains as hybrid institutions” with respect to hybrids
may be very relevant in the case of GI as conditions for heterogeneity, weak alignment
of interests, ineffective governance, and twofold relationships are recurrent.
It is worth to underline that GIs may paradoxically suffer from their own success.
First, in cases where the reputation is very well-established, this somehow transforms
the GI into an almost generic name. Marseilles soap, Champagne sparkling wine, Par-
mesan cheese, among others, are GIs that over time are increasingly used with refer-
ence to their generic substitutes. In such cases, it may be hard to protect and limit the
use of the name just as it is the case in very well-known trade controversies between
the EU and USA.
The second threat to successful GIs comes from GI sounding that, like in other sectors, is
rapidly spreading within, as well as across, countries. Famous brands face just the same
problem all over the world. Here, it is worth recalling that reactions to counterfeits and imi-
tations in case of GIs are more difficult to put in place due to collective action constraints
and to limited financial resources to be devoted to the discovery of such situations.
Short supply chains
Short chains where the focal company is a small farm or processing firm, or even a very
small scale retailer and where there are few passages from the raw material to the final
consumer, all mainly confined in local markets are increasingly common in the food sec-
tor although still represents a niche (Abatekassa and Peterson 2011; Renting et al. 2003).
These chains are essentially demand-driven as they respond to consumers’ inclination
for simple and local food that is assumed to be more genuine and fresher (Tables 1 and
2). Consumers associate short chains to the idea of traceable and transparent processes.
Both aspects are seen under a different perspective compared to the previous chains
where information is conveyed formally and codified by certifications and standards.
Consumers in short chains tend to privilege and prefer face-to-face relationships that
are regarded as more reliable and able to bring more warm connections among human
beings and a personal touch to transactions. In connection to the previous point,
boycotting global companies and anti-consumerism are ideology-driven behaviors that
also lead to a preference for small local businesses and short chains (Fridell 2006).
Moreover, these consumers often wish to foster smaller, family run business with
stronger territorial roots that are regarded as the guardian of traditions and local values
and promise more equitable market relations.
One more opportunity for short chains comes from the increasing demand for com-
bining food shopping to sightseeing. This is especially relevant for more touristic areas
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where arts and environmental amenities go together with the production of traditional,
typical food and beverages.
Farmers target to this dynamic market segment that offers new expanding opportun-
ities and occasions for more equitable market relations (see Section “A theoretical
framework for supply chains as hybrid institutions”).
Alternative ways of marketing goods in the short chains are on-farms’ shops, farms’
stores in nearby towns, farmers’ markets, and deliveries to final consumers (whether or
not organized in groups) at their homes, in offices, schools, or even in shops. Small
businesses may face difficulties in building their own reputation due to little visibility,
limited financial capabilities, and intense competition. While in the local market their
dimension is not so small in relative terms, in the larger market, the NITs that allow
for e-commerce enable also small producers to gain visibility and to reach farther
clients. Under this respect, some authors have pinpointed the possibility, and advan-
tages, of using social networks as a cheap and effective tool to reach this goal (Dentoni
and Reardon 2010). One more possibility for them is to sell through close-by outlets of
large retailers. Advantages and disadvantages of each channel, as well as complementar-
ities among them, are product and location specific.
Collective actions among small producers from the same, or close-by, area overcome,
at least to some extent, some relevant constraints faced by short chains when populated
by individual farm/producers. The first constraint is represented by the small basket of
products available in each single moment as well as over time. Also, each produce is
available for a shorter period. In the whole, it is difficult for a single farm to size prop-
erly the supply (especially for perishable produces) as, on the one side, it shall manage
stocks in order to limit shortages and surpluses. These constraints impinge consumers’
choice and reduce the attractiveness of short chains so that if the short chain can
manage to gather different producers it will take advantage of pooling their supply for
better matching final demand.
In some cases, farms may vertically integrate downstream the process to the final
product as a strategy for consolidating their market shares via a larger visibility in a
smaller final market and via more direct relationships with final consumers. Besides,
producers also aim at increasing their quota of the final value added. Furthermore, in-
ternalizing diverse functions may seek at a better use of owned inputs (typically family
labor force). Seasonality of farm production creates temporal unevenness in the use of
some inputs that in non-family farms may call for segmentation (as discussed in
Section “A theoretical framework for supply chains as hybrid institutions”) but,
diversely, in family farms where the cost of labor is implicit and often imply marginal
labor force, the internalization of different functions may be convenient and increase
overall efficiency.
The downside of such a strategy is that increasing the kind and number of functions
to be performed in-house is not at all trivial, especially for small farms. Farms that wish
to engage in the final product market necessarily need, at least to some extent, to per-
form more tasks and reorganize the whole process and set of functions. The challenges
involved in the process are frequently neglected or undervalued. First, dealing with the
final consumer is complex, takes time, and requires appropriate facilities and specific
competences. Producers are usually not trained to this end and tend to underesti-
mate competences and investments that may be necessary. The lack of awareness
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not only pertains to the marketing sphere but also the other tasks that will be
performed internally. Referring again to the previous section, it is clear how
operating the different tasks at scales that may not be optimal adds causes of inef-
ficiencies that influence unitary costs.
Forms of horizontal coordination can be put in place in short chains (Table 2) to help
overcome these limits. The farm/firm acting as focal and selling its product(s) usually
gather products by nearby producers and sell them together with its own. In this way,
the variety of the supply increases and the calendar is prolonged while supply may also
result in a more stable and reliable pattern. Furthermore, significant scope economies
may arise (i.e., sharing transport cost and/or the cost connected with the selling facil-
ities and of labor) improving the cost effectiveness of the chain. So, doing the firm at
the end of the chain becomes the focal company of the chain also thanks to the insights
gained over demand trends.
Supply chains driven by a specialized high quality retailer
In this kind of chain, the focal company is a retailer specialized in high quality food
(e.g., Eataly, iGourmet, Eat’s Food Market, Wholefoods). Here, we deal with a different
sort of retailer with respect to the one depicted in Section “Supply chains driven by a
large retailer.” These store chains are large (although not as large as global world retail
companies presented before) and may be nationally or internationally based; they may
sell via outlets as well as on the web. They sell high quality food specialties featured as
traditional ethnical organic, and so forth (Table 1). Product quality is the key element
of their reputation and their true competitive leverage while price in itself is far less im-
portant; although, of course, the price/quality ratio is altogether important. The core
capacity of these retailers is to scout the excellence of food around the world and to tell
their stories to the wider public (Table 1). They have the ability to create and launch
the so called “food icons”.
The governance of the chain is definitely less captive that in Section “Supply chains
driven by a large retailer” thanks to the reputation and capacity of the producers and
the uniqueness of their products and territories. The more balanced equilibrium
between the focal company and the other stakeholders led to elements of modularity
and relationality in the governance of such chains where reciprocal and sequential ver-
tical relations between the retailer and the producers define the coordination mode
(Table 2). The basic message delivered to consumers is of an intimate alliance and deep
knowledge between the seller and the producers; where the seller—a gourmet specialis-
t—is committed to linking directly these excellences of food with the consumer. The
retailer is a true story-teller, able to tailor its own story on each product. Small
producers, handicraft productions, typical products from small areas may find here
their window in the larger market.
These chains bridge relevant features of large retailers with those of GIs and short
chains. Being large retailers, they enjoy scale and scope advantages that bring higher possi-
bilities to offer a wider set of products and to invest in image, reputation, and outlets. Fur-
thermore, being specialized and very effective in the marketing functions, they definitely
outperform small farmers specialized in high quality that look at this channel as an effect-
ive way to be visible and enjoy market valorization of their product relying on the retailer
capacity that in turn rely on their capacity to produce outstanding quality.
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However, as recalled above, recent trends in large retailer pose a major challenge
to these chains as they are developing a quite sophisticated capability to welcome
and/or develop this very market segment in their outlets. Increasingly, often their
stores display well visible and demarked spaces devoted to local producers, to food
specialties and/or ethnic food, somehow mimicking the atmosphere/ambiance of
the gourmets’ stores.
Conclusions
The discussion presented in the previous pages was aimed at shading light on the es-
sential role that relationships going beyond mere market transactions do play in shap-
ing the organization of production. The paper focuses on food supply chains that are
here framed as hybrid institutions. In this light, it shows how the overall outline of the
chain, together with the competitiveness of the final products and the capacity of each
stakeholder to capture shares of the value added, rely deeply on the kind of governance
of the chain and on the nature, the intensity, and the stability of the relationships that
embed each stakeholder. This is particularly the case of highly fragmented sectors and
when quality, innovation, and other idiosyncratic features are relevant.
Small producers who go spot on the marketplace and are not embedded in any set of
more stable relationships likely will suffer from low investments capacity, low human
capital, and know-how and thus will be less innovative and will produce lower quality.
All in all, they will have no market power and make no profits.
Producers embedded in supply chains framed in the context of a captive governance
face tight relationships that may ensure market access in the short run but do not pro-
vide any stable operating framework and give them no voice in the shaping of the rela-
tionships and in the targeting of the chain product(s). The captive nature of the
governance implies that the relations that command on the production process and on
the rules for sharing profits may be changed or even broken easily and quickly by the
focal company almost at his own convenience.
Supply chains populated by reciprocal and pooled relationships and ruled by a more
relational kind of governance may offer many of the advantages connected to hybrids
in terms of efficiency, better market access, and improved bargaining power. However,
the paper has also discussed relevant difficulties and drawbacks that may arise due to
complexity of functioning, heterogeneity of stakeholders, and ambiguity of the nature
of relations among them.
All the above mentioned features have been discussed also with reference to six dif-
ferent agri-food supply chains. These are populated by different stakeholders and
shaped by different kind of relationships and with different forms of governance. It has
been shown how each of these chains enjoys its own strengths and suffers from specific
weaknesses and constraints. The discussion of these chains highlights situations where
the intensity and kind of relationships and the form of governance are not appropriate,
thus, compromising the sustainability of the chain and the competitiveness of its
product(s).
The policy makers in charge of framing the institutional settings in which the agro-
food sector shall operate are increasingly acknowledging the importance of the rela-
tional environment in which the various stakeholders operate. Under this respect, it
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must be said that, compared to present, up to the recent past, the awareness of the im-
portance of such dimension was lower among researchers, policy makers, and even
practitioners. For example, the regulation for GIs and the set of related incentives in-
cluded in the CAP to foster the adoption of GI schemes had not been enough determined
and clear in acknowledging the chain dimension behind GIs until the last revisions of the
policy. Some authors have seen in this a reason of the reduced effectiveness of such
schemes so far. Analogous considerations may be done also for different measures in-
cluded in past Rural Development Regulations by the EU that where, for example, foster-
ing short chains, diverse forms of direct selling, targeting the measures more on the single
beneficiary than of the collective actions that could have fostered the goal.
In conclusion, it is forth to pinpoint, that besides these factors, there are some com-
prehensive and somehow underlining conditions that play a major role in the possibility
to shape effective supply chains, and more generally effective hybrids that are com-
monly undervalued when not neglected tout court. An overall lack of social capital can
be related to (and it manifests itself in) the nature of firms and their behaviors. In par-
ticular, the discussion showed how the scarcity of trust impinges collective action. Trust
has been found as a major substitute of formalized forms of coordination and align-
ment, especially in a framework of informal relationships and weak governance
(Menard 2004). Furthermore, McKnight et al. (1998) found that trust is even more im-
portant in the initial creation of a hybrid institution. Trust and reciprocity may reduce
the ambiguity of the competition-cooperation attitude reinforcing the capacity to co-
operate that is a necessary ingredient of the relationships within hybrids.
Clear enough, also the effectiveness of the public sector plays a major role together
with the functioning of a legal system. Marsden et al. (2000) underline the relevance of
the role that effective regional agencies and active producers associations may play in
promoting GIs and designing competitive short chains by the means of setting incen-
tives to foster the appropriate relational behaviors.
Endnotes
1The notion of efficiency is directly connected to that of specialization and also asso-
ciated to the possibility of exchanging. Regarding hybrids, this notion is core, for ex-
ample, in the literature on industrial districts (Marshall and Marshall 1920; Becattini
1991)—one of the diverse forms of the hybrids—where one of the major strengths is to
be found in the extreme specialization of the firms and the consequent extensive use of
the market.
2Idiosyncrasy refers to the specificity of an investment (input, technology, or skill)
that is valuable only in one well-determined function and otherwise useless.
3Complementarity is meant as the necessary association between two or more ac-
tions, or inputs, as one is useless, or less valuable, without the other.
4Informal knowledge is related to learning-by-doing practices, is acquired through
personal experience, outside of the formal learning environments. Contextual know-
ledge refers to knowledge that is valuable in specific contexts but not in others; this
second concept is related, but not coinciding, with the previous one.
5External economies, also referred to as externalities, are economies associated to
conditions that are not internal to the firm/market. Network economies are benefits
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generated to the firm by the network in which the firm participates. Location econ-
omies arise when a firm benefit from a specific location. The concept has been widely
developed in different fields of economic thought among which is here worth to recall
the Industrial district literature (for a contemporary rediscovery of this Marshallian
concept, see above all, Becattini 1991).
6Local-g.a.p. is a new program of the EHI Retail Institute aimed at helping producers
in less favored countries to meet the requirements of Global-g.a.p.
7The European scheme (Reg. EU 1151/2012 ex Reg. CEE 2081/1992) includes two
different GIs: the well-known Protected Denominations of Origin (PDOs) and
Protected Geographical Indications (PGIs). For simplicity purposes, we will not distin-
guish between the two and will refer to the PDO case, with the implicit assumption
that our line of reasoning basically holds for both.
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